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EMPLOYEE PROTECTION FROM UNJUST
DISCHARGE: A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL
REVERSAL OF THE TERMINABLE-AT-WILL
DOCTRINE
Edwin Robert Cottone*
I. INTRODUCTION
'You can take this job and shove it! I ain't workin' here
no more [sic] . . . ."' Perhaps this classic song lyric by singer
Johnny Paycheck best demonstrates the theoretical principle
of mutuality that makes up the heart of the employment at-
will doctrine.2 The doctrine allows employers to fire employ-
ees "for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without be-
ing thereby guilty of legal wrong."' In other words, the em-
ployment at-will doctrine allows an employer to discharge an
employee for almost any reason or for no reason, as long as
contrary statutory or contractual provisions do not exist.4
The mutuality justification of the at-will rule has undergone
much criticism.5 This criticism is based on the fact that em-
ployees often have inferior bargaining power when compared
to their employers, rendering so-called mutuality of the at-
will doctrine illusory at best.6
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 42. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S., University of California, Berkeley.
1. Johnny Paycheck, Take this Job and Shove It, on JOHNNY PAYCHECK
GREATEST HITS (Country Music Foundation Records 1974).
2. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBEMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 910
(4th ed. 1998).
3. Payne v. W. & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on
other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 (1915).
4. See Judy Hitchcock, Comment, State Actions for Wrongful Discharge:
Overcoming Barriers Posed by Federal Labor Law Preemption, 71 CAL. L. REV.
942 (1983) (citing Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158
Cal. 551, 554 (1910), and Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20).
5. See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBEMAN, supra note 2, at 910.
6. See id.
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The employment at-will doctrine, however, does not apply
to all employees in the United States.! A minority of employ-
ees are protected from the "potentially harsh and unjust ef-
fects of this doctrine by collective bargaining agreements, civil
service legislation and antidiscrimination statutes."'  In-
cluded within this minority group are government employees
such as letter carriers, forest rangers and police officers, as
well as unionized employees such as laborers and steel work-
ers.' Government employees, in sharp contrast to their pri-
vate sector counterparts, maintain comprehensive legal pro-
tection against unjust discharge. 10  Moreover, unionized
employees typically retain unjust discharge protection pursu-
ant to a contractual collective bargaining agreement between
the union and the employer." Workers covered by anti-
discrimination statutes also enjoy at least partial protection
from the at-will rule because statutes prohibit those employ-
ees from using discriminatory reasons as a basis to terminate
employees.'" The bulk of today's private sector workforce,
however, is still susceptible to the at-will doctrine because the
majority of private sector employees are not in unions and be-
cause "many discharged employees find statutory protections
inapplicable to their situations."'3
In 1992, experts estimated that ninety million persons in
the United States were employed in private sector nonagri-
cultural jobs.'4 Roughly sixty million of these jobs were sus-
ceptible to the at-will doctrine.'" Currently, experts "estimate
that about two million at-will employees are terminated by
their employers each year."' 6 Researchers further estimate
7. See id.
8. See Hitchcock, supra note 4, at 942.
9. See id.
10. See infra Part II.D.
11. See Hitchcock, supra note 4, at 945.
12. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
13. Hitchcock, supra note 4, at 942.
14. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware of the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the
Model Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV., 849, 850 (1994) (citing
Current Labor Statistics, 115 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 80 tbl. 19 (June 1992)).
15. See id. (citing William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge
Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 404, 413-14 (1987)).
16. Sprang, supra note 14, at 850-51 & nn.5-6 (citing Theodore J. St. An-
toine, The Model Employment Termination Act: A Threat to Management or a
Long-Overdue Employee Right?, 1993 PROC. OF N.Y.U. 45TH ANN. NAVL CONF.
ON LAB. 270).
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that approximately 200,000 or more of the two million dis-
charged each year are wrongfully terminated.7 A discharge
that is "not justified by some nondiscriminatory business rea-
son that would meet the standard of 'just cause"' is considered
wrongful termination. 8 For example, a supervisor can law-
fully (although wrongfully) discharge an employee in pure re-
taliation when the employee reports to the employer work-
place conditions that are in violation of federal safety
regulations. 9 This harsh rule, which allows an employee to
be fired for even morally repugnant reasons, is in dire need of
judicial review."
The solution to this problem lies in the development of a
new common law principle that gives private, non-union em-
ployees some of the protections courts and legislatures have
given to public employees."' For example, pre-termination
grievance procedures are mandatory for public employees
such as firemen and judges.2 Private sector employees have
no such safeguards unless they belong to a union or have an
express contract with their employer stating that the em-
ployer will not fire the employee except for just cause.1
3
This comment explores the problems of at-will employ-
ment as well as the difficulties involved in extinguishing this
anachronistic doctrine. This comment begins with a brief de-
scription of the origin of American employment law. 4 Second,
it discusses the creation of the at-will doctrine, including its
history and adoption by the United States Supreme Court as
well as the legislative and judicially created exceptions to the
doctrine. 5 Third, contract exceptions to the at-will rule are
17. See Sprang, supra note 14, at 850-51 & n.7 (citing Model Uniform Em-
ployment Termination Act prefatory note reprinted in 9A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
21, 23 (Aug. 8, 1991)).
18. Id. at 850-51. "'Just cause' is the common standard that must be met to
support a discharge under the terms of most collective bargaining agreements."
Id. at 851 n.8 (citing WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE
OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAw 63 (1993)).
19. See McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 696 A.2d 173, 175-
76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
20. See RONALD B. STANDLER, HISTORY OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT IN THE
USA (revised Sept. 30, 2000), at http://www.rbs2.com/atwill.htm.
21. See generally, Skelley v. State Pers. Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975).
22. See infra Part II.D.
23. See infra Parts II.B.2-3.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Parts II.A-B.2.
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explored." Fourth, this comment explains a scholarly pro-
posal to enact a federal statute to overturn the common law
employment at-will rule. 2' Fifth, this comment introduces a
Montana state statute that protects employees from wrongful
discharge. 8 Sixth, the astounding difference between the ex-
tensive rights given to public employees and the limited
rights given to private employees will be investigated.29
The analysis section of this comment describes why the
legislative option is not a likely or viable alternative."° Fi-
nally, this comment proposes that the courts themselves cre-
ate a common law exception to the at-will employment doc-
trine that grants private employees the same rights that
government employees enjoy.3'
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Creation of the Employment At-Will Doctrine
American employment law was originally based on the
English law of master-servant. 2 English master-servant law
operated on the assumption that employment would last for
approximately one year.33 The two systems sharply diverged
around the end of the nineteenth century when American le-
gal systems developed the termination at-will rule. 4
"According to scholars, the termination at-will doctrine
first appeared in a legal treatise by Horace C. Wood.""5 To
support his bold and novel at-will employment rule, Wood
cited four American cases. 36  However, scholars claim that
none of the four cases Wood cited actually supported the
statement. 7 Nevertheless, Wood's rule gained acceptance in
the United States. After Wood's treatise, Master and Ser-
26. See infra Part II.B.3.
27. See infra Part II.C.1.
28. See infra Part II.C.2.
29. See infra Part II.D.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part V.
32. See STANDLER, supra note 20, at pt. 1.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
1262 [Vol. 42
2002] PROTECTION FROM UNJUST DISCHARGE 1263
vant,38 became widely known and accepted, courts began cit-
ing to it and the at-will rule became lawY.3  The establishment
of Wood's at-will doctrine culminated in 1908 when the
United States Supreme Court adopted the rule in Adair v.
United States." The Adair Court invalidated a federal stat-
ute that protected union employees from termination based
on their union membership.4'
B. Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine
1. Public Policy
Since Adair, the judiciary has made several exceptions to
the pure termination at-will rule.42 The original termination
at-will rule started to erode when the United States Supreme
Court overruled Adair in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.43 In Jones & Laughlin, the Court allowed a statutory
exception to the at-will rule." This exception prohibited em-
ployers from firing employees solely for being members of a
labor union.45 Subject to this single exclusion, the at-will rule
remained good law.46
Public policy exceptions led to a more significant erosion
of the at-will doctrine.47 In 1853, the early English case of
38. See id.
39. See id.
Scholars and jurists unanimously agree that Wood's pronouncement in
his treatise, Master and Servant, was responsible for the nationwide
acceptance of the rule. They also agree that his statement of the rule
was not supported by the authority upon which he relied, and that it
did not accurately depict the law as it then existed.
Id.
40. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (holding unconstitutional a
federal statute that made it a crime for an employer to fire an employee only
because he is a member of a union). But see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (overruling Adair and holding a similar statute valid
and constitutional; however the at-will rule was still good law subject to this re-
striction).
41. See Adair, 208 U.S. at 161.
42. See Brad D. Holmstrom, Employment At-Will in Iowa: Is it the
Rule or the Exception?, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 157, 160 (1989-90).
43. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 1.
44. See id.
45. See id. (holding as constitutional a federal statute that prohibited firing
employees based solely on union membership).
46. See id.
47. See Holmstrom supra note 42 at 160.
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Egerton v. Brownlow 48 articulated public policy in terms of
contracts, "[plublic policy ... is that principle of the law
which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public
good." If the rule in Egerton were taken to its logical ex-
treme, then it would allow judges to void any employment
contract that is either "injurious to the public or against pub-
lic good,""0 including at-will employment contracts."
Despite the seemingly broad power granted to judges by
Egerton, in practice judges usually only apply a "narrow
range" 2 of public policy exceptions to the employment at-will
rule.r3 In most states, judges will only recognize a public pol-
icy exception to the at-will rule if the exception is grounded in
either the state or federal constitution, a statute, or some
regulation designed to implement statutes. 4 These types of
exceptions are explored in the following cases.
In 1959, the landmark California case of Petermann v. In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters55 established the first
public policy exception to the at-will rule.6 In Petermann, the
plaintiff employee's employer asked him to perjure himself in
testimony before a state legislative committee. 7 The em-
ployee refused, and was fired the very next day. 8 The court
reasoned that making "one's continued employment.., con-
tingent upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance
of his employer would be to encourage criminal conduct upon
the part of both the employee and the employer and to serve
to contaminate the honest administration of public affairs." 9
The Petermann court grounded its public policy exception in
the state's penal code, holding that an at-will employee could
not be fired for refusing to violate a statute.60
48. Egerton v. Brownlow [1853] 4 H.L.Cas. 1, 196 (Eng.).
49. STANDLER, supra note 20 (quoting Egerton, 4 H.L.Cas. at 196 (Lord
Truro, J.)).
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959).
56. See STANDLER, supra note 20, at pt. 4.
57. See Petermann, 344 P.2d at 26.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 27.
60. See id.
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What if the employee exercised a statutorily granted
right? In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, the
Indiana Supreme Court created an exception to the at-will
doctrine for employees who were fired for exercising a statu-
torily granted right.6 In Frampton, plaintiff employee lost
her job because she filed a workers' compensation claim for an
injury sustained while on the job.62 The Frampton court rea-
soned that while an employee can be discharged without
cause under ordinary circumstances, "when an employee is
discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right,
an exception to the general [at-will] rule must be recog-
nized."63
In 1992, the California appellate court in Gantt v. Sentry
Insurance further defined the public policy exception to the
at-will rule.64 The Gantt court quoted its decision in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corporation" to begin its analysis:
[I]n Foley we endeavored to provide some guidelines [to
determining what public policy is] by noting that the pol-
icy in question must involve a matter that affects society
at large rather than a purely personal or proprietary in-
terest of the plaintiff or employer; in addition the policy
must be "fundamental," "substantial" and "well estab-
66lished" at the time of the discharge.
The Gantt court then described four categories in which
"courts and commentators alike" have found public policy ex-
ceptions.67 Those four categories include instances where the
employee was fired for the following: "(1) refusing to violate a
statute; (2) performing a statutory obligation; (3) exercising a
statutory right or privilege; and (4) reporting an alleged viola-
tion of a statute of public importance."68 The Gantt court ex-
pressed concern over judicial policy making, cautioning the
courts to use "great care and [to give] due deference to the
judgment of the legislative branch."9 The court held that the
61. See Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
62. See id. at 426.
63. Id. at 428.
64. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992).
65. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654 (1988).
66. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 687.
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"wise caveats against judicial policy making"7 would not be
necessary if a public policy exception to at-will employment
doctrine had to be based on statutory or constitutional provi-
sions.7'
In 1999, the California Supreme Court in Green v. Ralee
Engineering expanded on Gantt by grounding certain public
policy exceptions in federal regulations intended to protect
public safety.71 In Green, the plaintiff based his claim not on
statutory or constitutional grounds, but on his employer's vio-
lation of the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA").7 The plaintiff re-
ported the alleged FAA violations internally to his supervi-
sors and to the company president.74 Similarly, in Foley, the
plaintiff made only internal reports of his supervisor's embez-
zlement of company funds."' The Foley court, however, did
not recognize an exception to the at-will rule,"' whereas the
Green court did.77 In Green, the employer was violating FAA
regulations while manufacturing aircraft parts,"8 whereas in
Foley, the employee's supervisor was embezzling company
funds.' The Foley court held that the supervisor's embezzle-
ment of funds was not a public concern that warranted the
exception to the at-will doctrine and thus the plaintiff had no
cause of action.8' In Green, however, despite the fact that the
plaintiff never reported the alleged violations of FAA regula-
tions outside of the company, the court still found that the
public policy exception prevented the employer from firing
him at-will in retaliation for reporting.8 The Green court rea-
soned that the alleged violations of FAA regulations not only
violated the company's interest but also violated public safety
interests.8 The Green court distinguished Foley by reasoning
that the public interest must be at stake and not merely the
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1999).
73. See id. at 1057.
74. See id. at 1049.
75. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 375 (1988).
76. See id. at 374.
77. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1049.
78. See id.
79. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 375.
80. See id. at 401.
81. See Green, 960 P.2d at 1049.
82. See id.
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interests of the employee or employer." Moreover, the Green
court further reasoned that employees should not be discour-
aged from reporting these types of violations and thus a pub-
lic policy exception was appropriate because interests beyond
those of the individual employee or employer were at stake.84
The Green court expanded on Gantt by creating a public pol-
icy exception to the at-will doctrine based on violations of fed-
eral administrative regulations, rather than only allowing an
exception firmly based on constitutional principles or stat-
utes."
In a small minority of states, courts have recognized
judge-made public policy exceptions not rooted in constitu-
tional law or statutes." In Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Company,"7 the Illinois court declared, "[m]any of our
cases state that the public policy is to be found in the consti-
tution and statutes of this State and, when these are silent,
in the decisions of the courts."88 Similarly in Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc.,89 the Missouri appellate court reasoned that
judicial public policy exceptions were legitimate because
"[tihe at-will employment doctrine itself is judicially enunci-
ated public policy." ° The Boyle court stated further that ei-
ther state or national court decisions are an adequate basis
for public policy exceptions.8 '
In summary, there are few public policy exceptions to the
at-will doctrine. Thus, for private, non-union employees, the
83. See id. at 1057-58 (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373
(1988)).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1062 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
86. See STANDLER, supra note 20, pt. 5 (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharm., 417
A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878
(Ill. 1981) (Public policy "is to be found in the state's constitution and statutes
and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions."); Parnar v. Am. Hotels, 652
P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) ("[Plrior judicial decisions may also establish the
relevant public policy."); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985) ("[Public policy] finds its sources in the state constitution; in the
letter and purpose of a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision or
scheme; in the judicial decisions of the state and the national courts. . .
87. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
88. Id. at 881 (citing People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill.
75, 86 (1935); Ill. Bankers Life Ass'n v. Collins, 341 Ill. 548 (1930); Zeigler v. Ill.
Trust & Sav. Bank, 245 Ill. 180 (1910)).
89. Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
90. Id. at 871.
91. See id.
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at-will doctrine is still good law in most of the United States,9"
including California. 93 Essentially, private sector, non-union
employees can still be fired at the whim of their employer.
For this reason, most employees in the United States have
zero legal job security.94
2. Statutory Exceptions to At-Will Termination
The United States is one of the very few industrialized
nations that does not provide general statutory protection
against wrongful discharge." American employees who are
members of unions are typically not susceptible to the rule
however, because they are usually protected by a clause in
the union collective bargaining agreement that does not allow
firing of employees, except for just cause.96 Additionally, em-
ployees protected by particular statutes also enjoy protection
from termination based on unlawful justification. For exam-
ple, union and non-union employees alike enjoy protection
from discharge that is based on race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin,97 age,9" or wage garnishment.99 California aug-
92. See STANDLER, supra note 20.
93. See CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 2922 (West 2002) (providing that an at-will
employment may be ended by either party at any time without cause, for any or
no reason, and subject to no procedure except the statutory requirement of no-
tice).
94. See, e.g., id.; see also supra Part I.
95. See Hitchcock, supra note 4, at 945 (citing Summers, Individual Protec-
tion Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 509-19
(1976)).
The French principle of "abuse of right," for example, prohibits termi-
nations where the employer "acted with malicious intent, culpable neg-
ligence, or capriciousness." Germany prohibits "socially unwarranted
dismissals," i.e., the discharge must be based on the employee's conduct
regarding the job and "must be necessary to the effective operation."
Great Britain prohibits unfair dismissal and Sweden requires "objec-
tive cause" for termination.
Id. at 945 n.28.
96. See id. at 945 (citing 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS, &
CONTRACTS (BNA) 40:1, 51:1 (1979)). "A survey of the major types of provisions
in collective-bargaining agreements conducted by the Bureau of National Af-
fairs found that ninety nine percent of the contracts studied contained grievance
procedures and ninety six percent provided for arbitration." Id. at 945 n.29.
97. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2002); but see Miller v. Bay View United
Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1183-84 (2001) (holding that ap-
plication of section 2000e-2 to a church's employment decisions would constitute
excessive entanglement in violation of Establishment Clause).
98. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (2002).
99. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1674(a) (2002).
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ments the federal scheme of statutes and forbids discharge
based on jury service' 0 or an employee's involvement in un-
ion"' or political activity."' "Despite such protections, it has
been estimated that between sixty and sixty-five percent of
the nonagricultural work force is employed under contracts
that are terminable at-will."'°3
Although the aforementioned groups are statutorily pro-
tected, there are still more hurdles to jump over if the em-
ployer violates one of the antidiscrimination statutes. For
example, an at-will employee must meet the criteria of the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Reeves v. Sander-
son Plumbing Products, Inc., in order to sustain a prima facie
claim of discrimination.' The Reeves Court held that it was
insufficient for the jury to simply disbelieve the employer's
proffered reason for the termination;"5 the jury must also be-
lieve the plaintiffs claim of discrimination.' 6
A California case, Guz v. Bechtel, illustrates the difficul-
ties faced by an employee intent on proving a discrimination
charge.0 7 In Guz, the Bechtel Corporation went through a
"reduction in force" whereby plaintiff John Guz's working
group was downsized and relocated to another part of the
corporation.0 8 Guz, who was 49 years old, was willing to take
a grade and pay cut in order to maintain a position at his
group's new location.' Guz alleged that he was not even con-
sidered for the new jobs and, instead, two much younger
workers were assigned to the new location."' In her dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Kennard noted that by "[a]dopting the
United States Supreme Court's recent discrimination formula
in Reeves the majority found that Guz's claim of age discrimi-
nation was 'too weak to raise a rational inference that [age]
100. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (2002).
101. See id. § 923 (2002).
102. See id. § 1102 (2002).
103. Hitchcock, supra note 4, at 946 (citing Peck, Unjust Discharges From
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 n.9 (1979)).
104. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
105. See id. at 146-47.
106. See id. at 147.
107. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
108. Id. at 1094.
109. See id.
110. Bechtel filled the positions with workers that were between seven and
fifteen years younger than Guz. See id. at 1129.
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discrimination occurred.""" The Guz court reasoned that the
reduction in force gave the employer sufficient reason to ter-
minate Guz despite his age."'
3. Contract Exceptions to the At-Will Employment Rule
Typically, a contract based challenge to the at-will doc-
trine, absent a proper collective bargaining agreement or a
separate individual contract, will fail."' Further, even if the
employee did prevail, damages in a contract claim would be
limited to the employee's lost compensation.1 1 4 "The employee
cannot recover damages for the pain, anguish, and frustration
suffered as a result of the job loss."115 Despite these daunting
realities, the contract based wrongful discharge claim is the
most common cause of action asserted by discharged at-will
employees. 6 But contract claims that are based on an em-
ployer document, whether it be an employee handbook or
some other tangible employer policy have only a narrow
chance of success."7  In an unusual circumstance, a claim
based on employee manuals was upheld in the early case of
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield."8 In Toussaint, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that an employer's personnel
manual containing a statement that the company would only
fire for good cause was contractually binding on the em-
ployer."'
In the past, implied contract claims not to fire but for just
cause that were based on longevity of service, repeated oral
promises of continued employment, and good job performance
reviews have also been upheld." ° But, recently in Guz"' the
111. Id. at 1129 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
112. See id.
113. See Sprang, supra note 14, at 869 (citing William B. Gould IV, Stem-
ming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 404, 413-14 (1987) (stating that because an employee's potential recovery
will be based in part on the employee's income, damage recoveries will be lim-
ited)).
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292
N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980)).
118. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387-88 (Cal.
1988).
121. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
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California Supreme Court issued a landmark decision making
it harder for discharged employees to prove the existence of
an implied contract.122 The Guz court held that no implied
contract existed despite compelling conflicting arguments.'
Plaintiff Guz's contrary arguments included:
(1) his long service [of nearly 20 years]; (2) assurances of
continued employment in the form of raises, promotions,
and good performance reviews; (3) Bechtel's written per-
sonnel policy suggesting that termination for poor per-
formance would be preceded by progressive discipline... ;
and (4) testimony by a Bechtel executive that company
practice was to terminate employees for good reason, and
to reassign, if possible, a laid off employee who was per-
forming satisfactorily .... 124
The Guz court expressly held that lengthy employment, by it-
self, does not demonstrate an implied in fact contract not to
terminate at-will.2 5 Furthermore, the Guz court unanimously
rejected Guz's claim that his termination violated an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'26 "Guz argue[d], in
effect, that the implied covenant can impose substantive
terms and conditions beyond those to which the contracting
parties actually agreed [and such reasoning] directly contra-
dicts [this court's] conclusions in Foley."'27  The covenant
merely prevents "one contracting party from unfairly
frustrating the other party's right to receive the benefits of
the agreement actually made."2 ' Moreover, the court
asserted that a breach of an implied covenant cannot logically
be based on a claim that the discharge of an at-will employee
was made without cause.'29
In summary, the Guz court made it "easier for bosses to
sack workers."3 ° In doing so, the Guz decision made it harder
122. See id. at 1104.
123. See id. at 1102.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1104-05 (holding that the "employee's mere passage of time in
the employer's service, even where marked with tangible indicia that the em-
ployer approves of the employee's work, cannot alone form an implied-in-fact
contract that the employee is no longer at-will.").
126. See id. at 1109-10.
127. Id. at 1110.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Bizjournals.com, It's Easier to Get Fired, at http://www.bizjournals.coml
sanjose/stories/2000/10/02/daily6l.html (last visited May 15, 2002).
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for long term employees with good performance records to
prove implied employment contracts.' Moreover, the Guz
decision held that the age of the employee is not likely to be a
barrier to termination, further narrowing statutory discrimi-
nation protections.'3 '
C. Statutes That Prohibit Unjust Discharge
1. A Proposed Federal Statute
Several scholarly papers have proposed that legislatures
enact statutes to reverse the common law at-will rule.'3 For
example, in a Michigan law review article ("Stieber article")
the authors assert: "[t]he appropriate remedy for the problem
of unjust discharge is comprehensive federal legislation.' 34
In another publication, Professor Kenneth Sprang calls
for a federal statute that closely mirrors Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and "prohibits the discharge of any employee
without good cause."' Since both articles propose federal
statutes, this comment will focus on the Stieber article.
In their article, 3' Jack Stieber and Michael Murray begin
their proposal for federal legislation by asserting that "piece-
meal legislation and narrow judicial decisions are of only lim-
ited value."'' 7 They then outline, in eight steps, the elements
that drafters of the statute should consider."'
a. Limits on the Statute
The Stieber article first defines and limits the scope of
the proposed statute to include only wrongful discharge ac-
tions, including constructive discharge, instead of all types of
disciplinary actions (i.e., suspensions, demotions, etc.).' 39
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Dis-
charge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319, 323
(1983); Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in
New York, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137 (1989); see also STANDLER, supra note 20.
134. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 319.
135. See Sprang, supra note 14, at 921. ("The right to be protected against
wrongful discharge is as important as the right to be protected from invidious
employment discrimination."). Id.
136. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 319.
137. Id. at 336.
138. See id. at 337-41.
139. See id. at 337.
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b. Defining "Just Cause"
Second, the article suggests how the proposed federal
statute should interpret just cause.4 ' The article explains
that a termination decision in one case may amount to just
cause, but the same reason in another case may not.' In-
stead of attempting to define this slippery term in the pro-
posed legislation, the article instead suggests that the legisla-
tion should "incorporate the body of industrial common law
that already exists" " in order to prevent "unnecessary litiga-
tion." 4
3
c. Which Employers are Covered?
According to the Stieber article, the third criteria drafters
should take into consideration is employer coverage.'" Citing
the exemption for small employers in Title VII, the authors
suggest that employers with less than ten employees should
be exempt from the proposed federal statute. 4' Moreover, the
article also suggests exceptions for employers who are part of
a collective bargaining agreement that already provides em-
ployees with protection against unjust discharge and for em-
ployers that voluntarily take up a system of their own that
protects from unjust discharge.'46 Of course, the voluntary
employer system must meet statutory guidelines.
147
d. Which Employees Would be Eligible for
Protection?
The fourth step in the plan involves employee eligibility
for protection against unjust discharge under the proposed
statute.' Employees who already enjoy this protection such
as union members, tenured teachers, certain government em-
ployees, or those employees with an individual contract of
employment should be exempt from the federal statute.
140. See id.
141. See id. (citing F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS
610-66 (3d ed. 1973)).
142. Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 337.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 338.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 338.
149. See id.
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The article then proposes that employees with both unjust
discharge and employment discrimination claims should be
barred from also suing under the proposed unjust discharge
statute.5 The proposed statute would also have a minimum
service requirement before an employee would become enti-
tled to protection from unjust discharge "[in order to allow
employers to retain the necessary flexibility in determining
employee suitability for continued employment." 5' A recom-
mended minimum amount of service time is six months."'
e. Informal Remedies
The fifth criteria in the proposed statute calls for an in-
formal conciliation procedure that must occur before the un-
just discharge claim will be certified for a formal hearing."'
"Conciliation [or mediation] not only can speed the resolution
of complaints but can reduce administration costs by limiting
the number of cases going to formal hearing and arbitra-
tion.)' 54
f. Formal Remedies
Reinstatement with back-pay is the recommended formal
remedy for unjust discharge in large companies where the
employee can be placed under a different supervisor."' The
recommended remedy, however, is different for the employee
of a small company.'5' Because reinstatement may be
"unworkable" in a small company, the statute should be
flexible to allow a compensation award in these circum-
stances. '
g. Funding the Administration of the Statute
The seventh criteria involves cost.' 5' The Stieber article
suggests that the government should bear the costs of admin-
istering the statute.9 In order to prevent frivolous lawsuits,
however, the article suggests having each side pay a filing
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 339.
154. Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 339.
155. See id. at 340.
156. See id. at 339.
157. See id. at 339-40.
158. See id. at 340.
159. See id.
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fee. 6° The fee would be returned to the prevailing party."'
The article proposes that the amount of the filing fee could be
a flat rate or it could be a percentage of the employee's weekly
earnings."2
h. The Forum for Enforcement of the Statute
Finally, the Stieber article suggests that cases brought
under the statute should be decided by a single arbitrator
rather than a court.' The article suggests that the statute
should allow joint selection of an arbitrator from a qualified
select group.' The article also suggests that hearings should
be informal and that the "judicial system's rules of evidence
should not apply."165
2. A Montana State Statute that Protects Employees
From Wrongful Discharge
As of 1994, Montana was the only state in the nation to
adopt a statute that protects employees from wrongful dis-
charge.'66 The Montana Code provides:
(1) A discharge is wrongful only if:
(a) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to vio-
late public policy or for reporting a violation of public pol-
icy;
(b) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee
had completed the employer's probationary period of em-
ployment; or
(c) the employer violated the express provisions of its own
written personnel policy.
67
Subsection (a) of the Montana statute codifies the com-
mon law in California as described above.' Subsection (c)
embodies existing common law where a contract is found in
160. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 340.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 340.
166. See Sprang, supra note 14, at 855.
167. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM EMPLOYMENT ACT, MONT. CODE ANN. §§
39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (2001).
168. See supra Part II.B.1.
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the handbook or other written policy of the employer.'69 The
basis for subsection (b) cannot be found in California common
law, or any other state law for that matter.'70 The statute
protects employees who have completed an initial probation-
ary period from discharge without "good cause."'' The proba-
tionary period is defined by the employer at the onset of the
employment relationship, and if the employer discharges
without good cause, the employer has the burden of showing
that the employee was still providing services in the proba-
tionary period.' 2 In 1994, Montana law defined "good cause"
for purposes of discharge as "reasonable job-related grounds
for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job
duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legiti-
mate business reason."'' The Montana statute also requires
that employees exhaust all internal procedures an employer
may have put in place for the appeal of the discharge before
beginning the litigation process.'
4
D. Employment At-Will Versus Public Agency Employment
In California, the differences in protection against unjust
discharge between government and private employees are as-
tounding. The California Supreme Court in Skelley v. State
Personnel Board noted that "the California scheme regulating
civil service employment confers upon an individual who
achieves the status of 'permanent employee' a property inter-
est in the continuation of his employment which is protected
by due process."' 5 According to Skelley, permanent public
sector employees also enjoy several pre-removal rights and
"safeguards."'6 The Skelley court outlined these rights and
safeguards: public sector employees, before they are disci-
plined or terminated must be given "notice of the proposed
169. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885
(Mich. 1980). See also, Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622
(Minn. 1983).
170. See Sprang, supra note 14, at n.26.
171. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM EMPLOYMENT ACT, MONT. CODE ANN. §§
39-2-904(b) (2001).
172. See, e.g., Whidden v. John S. Nerison, Inc., 981 P.2d 271 (Mont. 1999).
173. Koepplin v. Zortman Min., Inc., 881 P.2d 1306 (Mont. 1994) (citing
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5)).
174. See WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM EMPLOYMENT ACT, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-911 (2001).
175. Skelley v. State Pers. Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 207 (1975).
176. Id. at 215.
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[disciplinary] action, the reasons therefor [sic], a copy of the
charges and materials upon which the action is based, and a
right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority
initially imposing discipline."'77 In other words, before a pub-
lic agency may take disciplinary action, Skelley compels the
public agency to first engage in an investigation or fact find-
ing process in order to determine whether the permanent em-
ployee did actually commit some type of wrongdoing.17 Next,
Skelley requires the public employer to provide the perma-
nent employee with notice of the proposed discipline, reasons
for the discipline, and a copy of the charges and materials on
which the disciplinary action is based.17 Skelley does not en-
title the employee to a full evidentiary hearing prior to being
disciplined, but the case does grant the employee an opportu-
nity to respond to the charges and to address the decision
maker before disciplinary action is taken.8 ° According to
Skelley, after the employee is given an opportunity to re-
spond, the public employer may terminate the employment. 8'
After termination, Skelley entitles the employee to make an
appeal of the decision to a neutral party.'82 Skelley permits
the appeal to be made within the structure of the public
agency.' Subsequent to this appeal, Skelley allows writ of
administrative mandamus' so that the employee can seek
judicial review of the decision under an abuse of discretion
standard of review. 85
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
A discharged employee in California and most other
states will likely find that they have no recourse against their
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See Skelley, 15 Cal. 3d at 215.
182. See id. at 203-04.
183. Id. at 204. After the decision to implement the discipline has been made
and the employee appeals to a neutral board within the agency, the burden is on
the employer to show why they implemented the discipline. See id.
184. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 1094.5 (West 2002).
185. See Skelley, 15 Cal. 3d at 216. When the employee seeks a writ of ad-
ministrative mandamus for judicial review of the outcome of the appeal, the
burden is placed on the employee to prove that the decision was an abuse of the
agency's discretion. See id.
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employer for terminating them without cause."'6 Firing anon-union p ivate employee, even for morally repugnant rea-
sons, is not illegal in California and most other statesa-
While unionized employees are protected from the at-will
doctrine by collective bargaining agreements,t and govern-
ment employees in California are protected under Skelley,n-
almost all other employees remain unprotected and suscepti-
ble to the at-will rule.' Private sectorjob security is subject
to employers' "unfettered right to fire at will." i Employees'
livelihoods are left unprotected and vulnerable t o t he whims
of their employers.' From hourly workers to executives, the
at-will doctrine cuts across the American workforce, allowing
purely arbitrary and capricious employment decisions to go
unchecked.'93 The following statement is one example of the
at-will doctrine's effects:
[A] fifty-two year old executive was given seventy-two
hours to clean out his desk and vacate the premises, alleg-
edly because his job was being eliminated after a corpo-
rate reorganization. He subsequently learned that the job
was reestablished after he left. Fourteen months later he
was still looking for suitable employment and wondering
why he had been let go. 94
Plainly, there is a need for legal protection from random,
unfounded terminations, sometimes based on morally repug-
nant reasons. This comment raises the question of whether it
rests upon the judiciary or the legislature to provide a solu-
tion to unjust discharge and the destruction of the at-will em-
ployment doctrine.
186. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 321; see also CAL. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 2922 (West 2002) (allowing at-will employment to be ended at any time
without cause, for any or no reason).
187. See CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 2922 (West 2002).
188. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 320.
189. See generally, Skelley v. State Pers. Bd. 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975).
190. See supra Part I.
191. Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 321.
192. See id. at 323.
193. See id. at 320-22.
194. See id. at 321-22 (citing WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 5). "One of
the authors of this Article received more than a hundred letters and phone calls,
most of them from middle management persons who had been discharged, al-
legedly without cause, after he wrote an article that appeared on the Op-Ed
page of the New York Times." Stieber, Speak Up, Get Fired, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 1979, at E-19, col. 2. See also The Growing Cost of Firing Nonunion Work-
ers, BUS. WK, Apr. 6, 1981, at 95; Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at n.16.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Protection from arbitrary discharge is a concept that is
slowly starting to gain momentum.9 For some years there
has been pressure on Congress and state legislatures to enact
statutes that limit and abolish the at-will doctrine.'96 Despite
the pressure on legislators and courts to change this common
law doctrine, the at-will rule is still thriving in California.'97
Although there has been pressure on legislatures, some
scholars have criticized taking a legislative approach to end-
ing at-will employment altogether.9 Scholars exhibit pessi-
mism regarding this approach because of the fact that at-will
employees are a diverse group and it is unlikely that they will
be able to organize themselves.'99 One difficulty in organizing
a pertinent federal lobby is the fact that employees who need
the protection of a statute range from low paid hourly work-
ers to managers and executives.' °° But organization is essen-
tial if the requisite lobbying pressure is to be placed on the
legislators' shoulders."°' Furthermore, "the unlikelihood that
such legislation will be enacted in the foreseeable future is
enhanced by the strong interest groups to be counted on to
oppose it."" 2 Even if at-will employees were able to get a
statute through to Congress, the very legislative process that
requires a myriad of compromise would probably drain any
potency of the proposed statute.23 This compromise is neces-
sary due to the big dollars and strong campaigns from those
on the opposing side: big business and profitable labor un-
ions."'
Instead of legislation, some scholars propose that the
courts themselves modify the rule.0 5 In particular, these
195. See generally STANDLER, supra note 20. See also Stieber & Murray, su-
pra note 133, at 323.
196. See STANDLER, supra note 20, at pt.3. See generally, Stieber & Murray,
supra note 133, at 323-37.
197. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 2922 (West 2002). See also Guz v.
Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
198. See STANDLER, supra note 20, at pt.3.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Id. (quoting Peck, The Role of the Courts and the Legislature in the Re-
form of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963)).
203. See Sprang, supra note 14, at 891.
204. See STANDLER, supra note 20, at pt.6.
205. See Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
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scholars argue that because courts have "considerable experi-
ence with similar employment relations problems, they pos-
sess sufficient expertise to resolve wrongful discharge dis-
putes."' °6 Individuals supporting this proposition believe that
courts need not await legislative initiative. ' Courts in Cali-
fornia, however, seem to resist making any exception to the
at-will doctrine unless it is based on legislative or other out-
side initiative.' ° In fact, the California Supreme Court in
Gantt v. Sentry Insurance warned against judicial policy-
making unless it is based on statutory or constitutional provi-
sions. °9 The California Supreme Court's reluctance to create
pure judicial exceptions is evidenced in the Green v. Ralee
Engineering decision.2"' In that case, the court based the ex-
ception on a federal regulation instead of simply modifying
the common law rule on its own.' The Gantt court's reason-
ing for refusing to create a public policy exception comes from
"the impression that only statutes or constitutional provisions
provide employers with adequate knowledge of what is for-
bidden by public policy."" ' The dissenters in Gantt assert
that this reasoning is wrong and insist that "judicial deci-
sions ... provide no less 'notice' than do statutes or constitu-
tional provisions." ' Therefore, it seems that in California,
the courts will not initiate a change to the common law rule
without some sort of outside initiative. The current court
may be persuaded that judicial action is appropriate based on
the fact that courts in other states are recognizing that judi-
cial decisions provide adequate notice to employers.
Although the most viable option for changing the at-will
rule in California lies in the hands of the court, this comment
looks at various statutes in order to frame a workable tem-
plate for an unjust discharge rule in California. This com-
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1837-38 (1980).
"Courts themselves created the rule, it is therefore entirely appropriate that
they take the lead in modifying it." Id. See also Claude D. Rohwer, Terminable-
At-Will Employment: New Theories for Job Security, 15 PAC. L.J. 759, 764-65
(1984).
206. Protecting At- Will Employees, supra note 205, at 1837-38.
207. See id.
208. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684-85 (Cal. 1992).
209. See id.
210. See Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1999).
211. See id. at 1055.
212. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 693 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
1280 [Vol. 42
20021 PROTECTION FROM UNJUST DISCHARGE 1281
ment focuses on the federal statute proposed by Murray and
Stieber, and the Montana state statute.214 The proposed fed-
eral statute and the Montana statute are definitely a step in
the right direction 215 and if some shortcomings of the statutes
were corrected, it would benefit at-will employees and relieve
the burden placed on courts enforcing these statutes. To il-
lustrate the pitfalls of both statutes, consider the following
hypothetical, which also serves to demonstrate the procedural
safeguards that public employees enjoy in California under
Skelley. 6
Paul Public and Adam AtWill are two residents of a small
town in California. Paul Public works for the state and
makes a living inspecting the electric wiring jobs of private
electric companies. From time to time, Paul inspects the
work of Adam AtWill, a non-union, private sector electrician.
Adam AtWill's job entails going house to house to work on his
company's overhead wiring. Adam AtWill's company employs
eleven workers total. Both Paul and Adam have been at their
jobs for over ten years, and both are over the age of forty.
Both men have also received several promotions and pay in-
creases. As it happens, Paul Public and Adam AtWill are
cousins and their normal workday has placed them both at
their elderly uncle's home, working on and inspecting com-
pany wiring. While Adam AtWill is working in the course
and scope of his job, his coworker Ned Nosey drives by the
house and sees Adam's company truck parked outside. Ned
Nosey, thinking that Adam AtWill is not really working, but
rather helping his elderly uncle, tells Adam's boss at AtWill
Electric. Adam AtWill returns to the office at the end of the
day and receives a termination notice from an irate supervi-
sor.
Fortuitously, one of Paul Public's coworkers also drives
by the house and sees Paul Public's truck parked outside.
Paul Public's coworker shares Ned Nosey's thoughts and pro-
ceeds to tell Paul's boss, Sheila Supervisor, the whole story.
Sheila Supervisor immediately jumps to conclusions and as-
sumes that Paul Public was not working and that he deserves
to be fired immediately. Sheila Supervisor, however, is cogni-
214. See infra Part IV.A-B.
215. See supra Part II.C.1-2.
216. See supra Part II.D.
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zant of the required Skelley procedures for terminating public
employees. Thus, she promptly initiates a fact finding inves-
tigation217 in order to determine what Paul Public was actu-
ally doing at his uncle's house during working hours.
Under current California law, Adam AtWill would imme-
diately be out of a job.218 Adam would legally be terminated
despite the fact that he was over forty, a loyal employee for
longer than 10 years, and the recipient of assurances of con-
tinued employment in the form of raises and promotions.219
On the other hand, Paul Public, whose truck was parked
right next to Adam's and whose boss reacted the same way as
Adam's, would enjoy the procedural safeguards of Skelley." °
A. The Proposed Federal Statute
Adam AtWill's situation under the Stieber proposed fed-
eral statute would be slightly different. First, in order to ana-
lyze Adam AtWill's situation under the statute one must as-
sume a highly unlikely proposition: that the statute passed
both houses of Congress without modification and the Presi-
dent did not exercise his constitutional veto power."
Adam AtWill would likely have a cause of action under
the statute's first and second criterion, which limits protec-
tion to wrongful discharge actions.222 Wrongful discharge is
defined as termination without just cause.223 The proposed
statute defers to the common law definition of just cause
rather than defining it outright.2 4 A termination based on
properly performing one's job would likely lack the necessaryjust cause required by the statute and thus would probably be
labeled as wrongful discharge.225 Stieber and Murray suggest
next that employers with less than ten employees should be
217. See supra Part II.D.
218. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1104 (2000) (holding
that the "employee's mere passage of time in the employer's service, even where
marked with tangible indicia that the employer approves of the employee's
work, cannot alone form an implied-in-fact contract that the employee is no
longer at-will").
220. See supra Part II.D.
221. See generally INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
222. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 337-38.
223. See supra Part II.C.l.b.
224. See supra Part II.C. 1.b.
225. See supra Part II.C.l.b.
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exempt from the statute. 26 Adam AtWill would be able to
bring a claim for unjust discharge against his employer based
on the proposed statute. Adam AtWill is currently unpro-
tected from unjust discharge because he is a non-union pri-
vate sector employee, without an express employment con-
tract, thus, he is eligible for protection under the proposed
22
statute.27 Adam will probably not bring an employment dis-
crimination claim against AtWill Electric because he was
fired for allegedly not working, therefore, he can still bring
suit under the proposed statute.22' Adam AtWill would likely
also meet any minimum service requirements because he has
been with AtWill Electric for over ten years.2 29
The proposed statute is susceptible to criticism because
Adam AtWill must be fired before he has a chance to rebut
the accusations against him. In other words, the statute does
not allow for a pretermination employee grievance process.
Thus, Adam AtWill must be terminated without wages before
he can challenge the employer's decision. This predicament
may affect his financial ability to seek the assistance of an at-
torney. Requiring termination before the grievance process
can begin not only affects Adam, but also has an economic
impact on society. Although the proposed federal statute
would compel Adam and AtWill Electric to participate in an
informal conciliation procedure before going to a formal hear-
ing,236 this procedural safeguard does not take effect until af-
ter Adam AtWill is terminated.
The next consideration under the proposed federal stat-
ute involves remedies.2 31 The statute wisely declares that re-
instatement may be "unworkable" in a small company like
AtWill Electric with its eleven employees. 2  Thus, because
the statute offers no protection until after the unjust termina-
tion occurs, Adam may be out of a job for quite some time.
Though he may receive compensation under the proposed
statute,233 if he cannot find a comparable job in the small town
that he lives in then the statute has not provided a complete
226. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 338.
227. See id. at 338 n.129.
228. See id. at 338 n.130.
229. See id. at 338 nn.131, 132.
230. See supra Part II.C.l.e.
231. See supra Part II.C.f.
232. See supra Part II.C.1.f.
233. See supra Part II.C.1.f.
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answer to the problem.
The proposed statute further suggests that cases should
be heard by a single arbitrator rather than a court.234 But the
statute suggests that before going to an arbitration hearing,
both parties should be required to pay a filing fee. 235 Now, in
addition to being out of work and having to pay for competent
representation, Adam AtWill must also pay a filing fee. The
article also suggests that the arbitrator should be chosen by
both parties from a select group.236 This practice tends to fa-
vor sophisticated management over the unsophisticated elec-
trician. Moreover, the longer any disagreement goes on re-
garding the selection of the arbitrator, the longer that Adam
will be without work, increasing the chances that he will be
replaced by another worker.
B. The Montana Statute
Although the Montana statute is progressive and does
protect employees from wrongful discharge, it is still far from
perfect. First, the statute does not require the employer to
engage in a fact-finding process to ensure that the employee
actually did what they were accused of doing. 37 Second, the
statute does not require the employer to provide notice of the
proposed termination to the employee and the reasons there-
fore.238 Requiring this type of notice would enable the em-
ployee to present proof of his or her innocence. Third, the
statute does not require an intermediate informal meeting be-
fore going to court unless the employer voluntarily has in
place an internal procedure by which the employee can ap-
peal the decision.239 In California, pre-discharge procedures
are not in place and this would likely flood the already over-
burdened courts with these types of cases. Because these
procedural safeguards are lacking, the employee only has a
cause of action after he is fired. Thus, it is likely that the
employee can only seek redress through the judiciary. There-
fore, the protection of the Montana statute may in fact be il-
234. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 134, at 340.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See supra Part II.C.2.
238. See supra Part II.C.2.
239. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM EMPLOYMENT ACT, MONT. CODE ANN. §§
39-2-911(2) (2002).
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lusory for employees without the financial capability to hire
counsel. Consequently, it is likely that a large portion of the
workforce is still unprotected in Montana.
What would happen to Adam AtWill under the Montana
statute? The Montana statute requires the employee to have
completed a probationary period before being eligible for pro-
tection against unjust discharge. 40 Adam AtWill is most
probably past any probationary period because he was em-
ployed at AtWill Electric for over ten years. The Montana
statute also requires that the employee exhaust all internal
procedures for redress. It is likely that internal procedures to
redress unjust discharge would be cost prohibitive at a small
company like AtWill Electric. Therefore, Adam AtWill is in a
similar predicament under both the Stieber proposed statute
and the Montana statute; he is out of work and must scram-
ble to find funds to hire an attorney for a long, drawn out bat-
tle. Moreover, the Montana statute is flawed in that litiga-
tion is apt to be the battleground for the dispute, rather than
informal conciliation and arbitration as proposed by Stieber
and Murray.241 Although the statute allows "either party to
,,242
make a written offer to arbitrate, it does nothing to compel
arbitration.243 Furthermore, unlike Skelley, the Montana
statute does not require pre-discharge notice to the employee
of the proposed disciplinary measure, nor does it grant the
employees a chance to respond. 4 4 The lack of informal pre-
termination procedures will likely create more work for the
courts because resolution will not occur until the parties are
in court.
45
C. Skelley Procedural Safeguards
If Adam AtWill had been in Paul Public's shoes he almost
240. See supra Part II.C.2.
241. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 134, at 340.
242. See supra Part II.C.2.
243. See supra Part II.C.2.
244. See supra Part II.C.2-D.
245. With pre-termination procedures in place, it is more probable that dis-
putes will be settled prior to litigation, thus eliminating the need to go to court.
An example of this logic is shown in Jack Stieber & James R. Murray, Protec-
tion Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 319, 339 (1983). "[Informal] [clonciliation not only can speed the reso-
lution of complaints but can reduce administration costs by limiting the number
of cases going to formal hearing...." Id. at 339.
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certainly would not have been terminated. Paul Public enjoys
several procedural safeguards under Skelley. 46 Before Sheila
Supervisor may discipline Paul, she must conduct a fact-
finding process to determine if Paul Public actually engaged
in wrongful conduct. 47 Shelia would likely talk to the med-
dling coworker, Paul's uncle and Adam AtWill. Also, she
would almost certainly look at Paul's daily records of the in-
spections he completed, and would probably determine cor-
rectly that he was performing his state job at his uncle's
home.
Following the investigation, Sheila Supervisor is required
to present Paul Public with pre-discipline notice of the pro-
posed termination and allow Paul Public an opportunity to
respond.248 Only then could Sheila Supervisor fire Paul Pub-
lic. 49 If Sheila Supervisor pushed the issue this far and actu-
ally did terminate Paul for doing his job, then under Skelley,
Paul is entitled to appeal her decision within the agency it-
self.259 During this internal appeal process, Sheila would have
the burden of showing that she legitimately fired Paul Pub-
lic.25' If the appeal also proves fruitless, then Paul can file for
a writ of administrative mandamus where a court will review
Sheila Supervisor's decision.5 2
Requiring an employer to determine what actually hap-
pened before handing down a discharge notice is fair for both
parties involved. Also, by putting several pretermination
safeguards in place, none of which involve the judiciary, Skel-
ley increases the chance that disputes will be settled before
they get to court.252 Moreover, Skelley further minimizes the
court's role in supervising unjust discharge by granting the
employee an opportunity to appeal the decision prior to litiga-
tion. 54
D. The Judicial Answer
"For the foreseeable future, unorganized employees, like
246. See supra Part II.D.
247. See supra Part I.D.
248. See supra Part I.D.
249. See supra Part I.D.
250. See supra Part I.D.
251. See supra Part II.D.
252. See supra Part II.D.
253. See supra Part II.D.
254. See supra Part I.D.
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consumers in the products liability area, must look primarily
to the courts for protection against arbitrary or malicious dis-
charge in those areas where Congress or the state legislatures
have not acted."2" For a court to eliminate the at-will rule, it
is not necessary for the California legislature to "repeal statu-
tory enactments such as the California Labor Code that es-
tablishes or confirms the terminable-at-will norm."256 "After
all, a California Code section that clearly established con-
tributory negligence as the law of the state did not preclude
the common law adoption of comparative negligence."257
While the two statutes analyzed above are a step in the
right direction, more needs to be done for private sector em-
ployees.258 It is unfair and irrational to provide public em-
ployees with comprehensive safeguards2.9 while their private
sector counterparts labor under the fear that they may be
terminated at their employers' whim.2"' It is then illogical
that courts should grant private sector employees some or all
of the Skelley protections enjoyed by public employees. While
it is tempting to turn to the legislature for a solution to the
problem, the reality is that unorganized employees are unable
to voice their concern loud enough to be heard.261
V. PROPOSAL
"Societal attitudes towards employee rights in general,
and to job security in particular, have evolved significantly in
the last fifty years, and the law must respond to this new per-
ception of what is an appropriate set of basic rules."262 This
comment proposes a basic set of rules for a common law doc-
trine that reverses the at-will rule. Collectively, these ideas
will be referred to as the "equitable discharge rule." The
ideas that comprise the equitable discharge rule are heavily
based on the Skelley procedures.263 Moreover, this proposal is
not limited to judicial implementation. In the unlikely event
that at-will employees managed to organize and lobby for a
255. See STANDLER, supra note 20, at pt.3.
256. Rohwer, supra note 205, at 781.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See supra Part II.D.
260. See supra Part I.
261. See STANDLER, supra note 20, at pt.3.
262. Rohwer, supra note 205, at 781.
263. See supra Part I.D.
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statute, the following suggestions would likewise be applica-
ble.
A. What Should the Rule Cover?
Similar to the Stieber and Murray statute, the equitable
discharge rule would be limited to only include wrongful dis-
charge actions, including constructive discharge, instead of all
disciplinary actions that may be taken by employers (i.e.,
suspensions, demotions, etc.). 264
B. Which Employees Would be Covered?
The equitable discharge rule should cover private sector
non-union employees. Employees with express contracts
would not gain the protection of the rule. Furthermore, the
rule would permit at-will employment during an employer
specified probationary period not to exceed one year, "in order
[to allow] employers to retain the necessary flexibility in de-
termining employee suitability for contin[ued] employ-
ment.
265
C. Which Employers Would be Covered?
Employers with five or more workers should be held re-
sponsible for adhering to the equitable discharge rule.
D. Acceptable Reasons for Termination
The equitable discharge rule would only allow termina-
tion for "just cause." This slippery term has been defined al-
ready by thousands of court cases.266 Some classic examples of
just cause include "[e]xcessive absenteeism or tardiness,...
sleeping on the job,.., fighting,.., theft, dishonesty, incom-
petence, gross negligence, ... possessing or using drugs or al-
coholic beverages at work, or reporting to work under the in-
fluence of drugs or alcohol... ,,267 The courts could tailor this
standard in order to allow necessary business type activities,
such as corporate downsizing, to remain unaffected by the
equitable discharge rule.
264. See supra Part I.C.l.a.
265. Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 338.
266. See supra Part I.C. 1.b.
267. Stieber & Murray, supra note 133, at 323.
1288 [Vol. 42
2002] PROTECTION FROM UNJUST DISCHARGE 1289
E. Pretermination Grievance Procedures
Employers wishing to terminate after the employee has
passed their probationary period should be required to go
through a five step Skelley type procedure.268
1. Investigation
The employer should be required to engage in a fact find-
ing process to solidify if termination is required. This fact
finding process should be thorough and fair and should in-
clude interviews with the accused employee and any wit-
nesses.
2. Pre-Discipline Notice
Prior to termination, the employee should be presented
with a copy of the reasons and facts that provide a basis for
the termination.
3. Pre-Termination Opportunity to Respond
The employee should be entitled to an informal opportu-
nity to rebut the reasons upon which the termination is being
based. Although legal counsel is permitted to accompany the
employee, this opportunity to respond is not a full blown
hearing with judicial rules. After the employee has had a
chance to respond, the equitable discharge rule would allow
for termination.
4. Appealing the Employer's Decision
After the first three steps are exhausted, the employee
may take the issue to court. By affording the employee pre-
termination safeguards, it is likely that fewer cases will ever
make it to this level in the grievance process.
F. Equitable Discharge Proposals Also Applicable to a
Statute
It seems unlikely that Congress or the California state
legislature will pass a statute reversing the at-will rule in the
near future.269 If such a statute were to be proposed, however,
the above criteria would be just as applicable to the new stat-
268. See supra Part II.D.
269. See supra Part IV.
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ute as they are to a judicially created common law rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Montana statute reversing the at-will
employment doctrine as well as scholarly proposals to end at-
will employment, provide evidence of society's changing atti-
tude towards legal job security.27° This is not surprising when
roughly sixty million employees have no legal protection from
the unfettered discretion of their employers.27' The answer
lies in a legislative or judicially made rule that reverses the
at-will doctrine.272 But it is unlikely that either a federal or
California state statute of this nature will be passed in the
near future.273 Like the judge-made product liability protec-
tions granted to consumers, the solution to at-will employ-
ment must come from the courts.274 Accordingly, this com-
ment urges the judiciary to extend public employee
protections to private sector employees.
See supra Part III. & V.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.D.
See supra Part V.
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